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Abstract
Banks’ corporate control of ﬁ  rms is likely to increase the likelihood of providing a 
future loan as it mitigates information asymmetry and agency costs of debt. Using 
a sample of retail loans to Portuguese ﬁ  rms, we ﬁ  nd that a bank corporate control 
enhances the probability of providing a future loan by 10 percentage points relative 
to a relationship lender with no control. This ﬁ  nding is robust to the inclusion of many 
ﬁ  rm-level controls and to instrumental variable methods to correct for the potential 
endogeneity of banks’ equity stakes in borrower ﬁ  rms. The effect is lower when the 
borrower has multiple lending relationships or multiple banks as shareholders. Our 
results suggest that banks’ corporate control affect the choice of the lender in the 
corporate loan market.
1. Introduction
Bank loans are the most common source of external ﬁ  nance for corporations worldwide. For countries in 
the euro area, loans are by far the most important source of debt ﬁ  nancing of ﬁ  rms compared with debt 
securities, which account for less than 10 percent of total debt. Banks have advantage in accessing and 
producing information on the companies they lend to by developing close relationships with them. In 
fact, repeated loan transactions and delivery of other ﬁ  nancial services are associated with a build-up of 
property information in the bank-ﬁ  rm relation, with signiﬁ  cant beneﬁ  ts for the lender. This is supported 
by theoretical studies and empirical evidence.1
Bank-ﬁ  rm relationships extend beyond just repeated lending interactions. In fact, universal banks act as 
lenders, but they also underwrite and trade securities, hold equity stakes in corporations, and manage 
mutual funds. Thus, there is room for banks to play a prominent role in the governance of corporations.2 
In addition, a growing channel of bank inﬂ  uence over ﬁ  rm governance is through institutional holdings. 
Many universal banking groups have developed large asset management arms in recent years, such as 
bank trust services, mutual funds, and pension funds. These funds can and do invest in the same ﬁ  rms 
to which banks make loans and in which they have equity stakes.
In this work, the effect of banks’ involvement in corporate governance as shareholders on access to the 
loan market is examined for Portuguese ﬁ  rms. Credit availability is of major importance, in particular 
1  See Boot (2000) for a survey of this literature. Other articles include Bharath et al. (2007).
2  Bank stakes are rare in the U.S., given the historical restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act on bank ownership of 
non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. Several other countries allow banks to take equity stakes in non-ﬁ  nancial corporations (see 
Santos (1998) for a survey).
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credit to small and medium-sized ﬁ  rms as these ﬁ  rms are said to be crucial to the development of 
many economies. We ﬁ  rst test if an insider bank can be a more effective monitor and mitigate ﬁ  nancial 
constraints. With the additional information they obtain as shareholders of the ﬁ  rm, banks may be able 
to better screen loans and obtain private information on the ﬁ  nancial status of the borrowing ﬁ  rm. If 
banks share these information rents with ﬁ  rms, we expect to see more lending when a bank plays a 
role in the governance of a ﬁ  rm. A testable implication therefore is that an insider bank is more likely to 
capture the future lending business of its borrower:
  – Hypothesis 1 (H1): Banks with equity stakes on a given ﬁ  rm face an higher probability of attract-
ing future lending business from that ﬁ  rm.
Our second hypothesis relates to the strength of the relationship as this strength is also likely to affect 
the choice of future lenders. Indeed, ﬁ  rms with a stronger relationship with the insider bank may ﬁ  nd it 
easier to obtain credit from that bank. In addition, they may not face many ﬁ  nancing alternatives avail-
able due to an adverse selection problem as they may be locked-in by the insider bank.3 We capture this 
idea in our second hypothesis:
  – Hypothesis 2 (H2): The stronger the relationship between the ﬁ  rm and the insider bank, the 
higher the probability of attracting future lending business from that ﬁ  rm.
A sample of loans to private and publicly listed non-ﬁ  nancial Portuguese ﬁ  rms over 2001-2007 is used 
to study the effect of banks’ corporate control in the ﬁ  rms’ access to the credit market. Our sample is 
dominated by private ﬁ  rms, where information asymmetry and agency costs of debt are likely to be high.
Concerning hypothesis 1, results indicate that ﬁ  rms tend to get more loans from banks that hold their 
equity than from other banks. Banks with a control stake in the ﬁ  rm are roughly 10 percentage points 
more likely to be picked as future lenders than banks with no such stake. Regarding hypothesis 2, we ﬁ  nd 
that the probability that an insider bank provides a future loan decreases with the borrower’s number of 
lending relationships and the borrower’s number of bank shareholders, where these variables were used 
as proxy for the strength of relationship. These ﬁ  ndings are  consistent with hypothesis 2.
The article proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present a brief review of the literature. Section 3 describes 
the data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the methodology and the main empirical 
results. Finally, the main conclusions of this article are presented in the last section.
2. Related literature
Banks’ stakes on non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms can provide them access to information on the ﬁ  rm’s ﬁ  nancial health. 
Indeed, the borrower may be inclined to reveal more information to the bank, and the bank itself has 
greater incentives to produce information (Boot (2000)). Whenever a banker sits on a board, it will gain 
access to additional information that can provide some control over a borrower. This may affect the 
ﬁ  rm’s access to the credit market if the insider bank is a potential lender.
Other authors have studied prior lending activity and its effect on the probability that banks extend loans 
and win underwriting mandates (Yasuda (2005), Bharath et al. (2007), and Drucker and Puri (2005)). 
Evidence so far on the inﬂ  uence of banks on corporations through equity stakes or board seats is mixed 
(Drucker and Puri (2006)). In Germany, Gorton and Schmid (2000) found that banks use their equity hold-
ings and board seats to improve ﬁ  rm performance, while more recently Dittman, Maug, and Schneider 
(2007) found evidence that bank representation on the boards of non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms is not necessarily 
in the best interest of ﬁ  rms. In Japan, ﬁ  rms with close bank ties have higher borrowing costs (Weinstein 
3  A bank’s special position as an insider may also allow the bank to extract rents from its information monopoly 
and potentially to “hold-up” a ﬁ  rm due to information asymmetries between other lenders and the borrower 









and Yafeh (1998)); they also experience poorer proﬁ  tability (Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000)); 
adopt policies that favor creditors over shareholders (Morck and Nakamura (1999)); and face higher 
bond underwriting fees (Yasuda (2007)). In Europe, Kracaw and Zenner (1998) ﬁ  nd a negative stock 
price reaction to bank loans if a banker sits on a borrower’s board of directors.
Our research contributes to the literature on relationship banking by using insider stakes to capture how 
dependent the ﬁ  rm is on its lender. Other authors focus on other measures of the intensity of bank-ﬁ  rm 
relationships such as the geographic distance between bank and borrower (Petersen and Rajan (1994), 
Degryse and Ongena (2005)); the duration of the relationship (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and 
Udell (1995), Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000), and Ongena and Smith (2001)); and the nationality 
of both bank and borrower (Carey and Nini (2007) and Houston, Itzkowitz, and Naranjo (2007)). The 
evidence favors improved credit availability, but there is mixed evidence regarding borrowing costs. Berger 
and Udell (1995) ﬁ  nd that ﬁ  rms with longer lending relationships pay lower interest rates, while Degryse 
and Van Cayseele (2000) ﬁ  nd contract terms deteriorate with the duration of relationships in Europe.
Our ﬁ  ndings suggest that universal banks involvement in non-ﬁ  nancial corporations as shareholders 
has implications in the credit market. An insider bank is likely to be the ﬁ  rm’s main lender, which may 
generate beneﬁ  ts to the ﬁ  rm in terms of credit availability but can also hold up the ﬁ  rm. This information 
monopoly could be later exploited by the insider bank by extracting rents from the ﬁ  rm. This ﬁ  nding 
suggests that regulators should be aware of the credit market implications of policies regarding the 
structure of the banking system, in particular in what respects the involvement of banks as shareholders 
of non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms.
An important concern with our ﬁ  ndings is that a bank’s presence as a equity holder arises endogenously 
in response to governance issues (Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010)). Indeed, a bank could become 
an insider in ﬁ  rms that face difﬁ  culties to access to credit markets and have higher borrowing costs. We 
address this concern in several ways. As a ﬁ  rst approach, we measure bank equity stakes with a one-
year lag relative to the lender choice. The results are also consistent if we measure bank equity stakes 
using a three-year lag. We also show that the positive effect of a bank insider stake on the lender choice 
remains strong after controlling for a long list of possible covariates. Moreover, the results are robust 
to the inclusion of ﬁ  rm (and bank) ﬁ  xed effects. As a last approach to address endogeneity concerns, 
several estimations using instrumental variables are carried out.
3. Data
We use an unique data set constructed from several data sources: the Securities Statistics Integrated 
System, the Central Credit Register, the Central Balance-Sheet Database, the Quadros de Pessoal and 
Thomson Reuters. The data covers the period from 2001 to 2007 and the analysis is restricted to the 
20 largest banks operating in Portugal, when measured regarding credit granted or equity holdings.
The Securities Statistics Integrated System gathers information on equity and debt securities issued by 
non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms allowing to identify the Portuguese non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms on which banks have equity 
stakes, as well as the market value of their positions. This data source also allows us to identify if the 
equity stake and the debt security is hold by the bank or through a mutual fund or other institution 
belonging to the banking group.
The Central Credit Register, managed by Banco de Portugal, collects monthly information on loans granted 
to non-ﬁ  nancial corporations by all credit institutions operating in Portugal. We use information from 
this database to also compute the number of banking relationships of each ﬁ  rm and the market share 
of banks in terms of credit granted to ﬁ  rms.
Additional data for this work comes from the Central Balance-Sheet Database, providing the accounting 































































Quadros de Pessoal and Thomson Reuters, are used to complement the database with additional variables 
on ﬁ  rms. From the Quadros de Pessoal database, which is a mandatory employment survey collected 
yearly by the Portuguese Ministry of Labor and Social Security, we are able to collect information on 
the existence of foreign shareholders in the company. Information on which ﬁ  rms are publicly listed is 
obtained from Thomson Reuters.
As the objective of this work is to test if a bank is more likely to grant a loan to a ﬁ  rm where it has 
an equity stake, we need to construct all possible pairs between banks and borrower ﬁ  rm. Hence, for 
each ﬁ  rm and for each year, we expanded the database to consider all possible combinations between 
each ﬁ  rm and the largest 20 banking groups operating in Portugal. Notice that some of these pairs are 
matched, that is, the bank that holds the equity stake lends to the ﬁ  rm; while others are not matched. 
In addition, ﬁ  rms where banks do not have equity stakes were also included as a control group. Given 
that the sample period covers the period 2001-2007, 20 banking groups and more than 2,000 ﬁ  rms, 
the sample has more than 300,000 observations. These ﬁ  gures are restricted to non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms 
which have information on both the Central Credit Register and the Central Balance-Sheet Database for 
at least four years in the sample period and that have annual total assets of at least ten million euros.
Table 1 presents the detailed deﬁ  nition of variables. There are variables concerning the credit relation-
ship and bank ownership between banks and ﬁ  rms; ﬁ  rm variables that allow the characterization of the 
ﬁ  rms in the sample and a bank variable that measures the market share of the bank in terms of credit 
granted to non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. Our sample comprises a total of 874 bank equity stakes in the 2001-2007 
period, corresponding to a total of 454 ﬁ  rm-year observations. Across this period of time, banks have 
an equity stake on about 60 Portuguese ﬁ  rms and each ﬁ  rm has, in most cases, 1 or 2 banking groups 
Table 1
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
The equity stake is deﬁ  ned as the market value of the equity stake as a percentage of the book value of equity if higher than one 
per cent. 
Bank-ﬁ  rm variables
Loan (dummy) Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the banking group grants credit to the 
ﬁ  rm, and zero otherwise.
Loan (%) Variable that measures the credit granted by the banking group as a percentage of total 
loans of the ﬁ  rm.
Bank ownership (dummy) Dummy variable that takes the value of one when there is an equity stake, and zero 
otherwise.
Bank ownership (%) Variable that measures the equity stake when it exists, and zero otherwise. 
Bank public debt ownership (dummy) Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the banking group owns debt securities 
of the ﬁ  rm, and zero otherwise.
Bank public debt ownership (%) Variable that measures the value of debt securities owned by the baking group as a 
percentage of total debt of the ﬁ  rm.
Credit relationship Variable that measures the credit granted by the banking group as a percentage of total 
loans of a given ﬁ  rm at the end of the year prior to the loan.
Firm variables
Assets Logarith of total assets.
Return on investment EBITDA as a percentage of total assets.
Tangible ﬁ  xed assets Tangible ﬁ  xed assets as a percentage of total assets.
Interest coverage EBITDA as a percentage of interest paid.
Leverage Financial debt as a percentage of total assets.
Number of lending relationships Number of banking groups granting credit or setting credit lines to a given ﬁ  rm. If a 
ﬁ  nancial institution does not belong to a banking group it is taken as a banking group 
itself.
Number of ﬁ  nancial shareholders Total number of banking groups with an equity stake on a ﬁ  rm, where a ﬁ  nancial 
institution not belonging to a banking group was assumed as a banking group itself.
Bonds Dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁ  rm has public debt and zero otherwise. 
Foreign capital Variable that measures the percentage of capital owned by foreigners.
Listed Dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁ  rm is publicly traded and zero otherwise. 
Bank variables
Bank market share Bank market share measured in terms of credit granted to non-ﬁ  nancial corporations.









as shareholder. Equity stakes are more frequent in the bank division than on non-bank divisions (i.e., 
insurance companies, mutual funds, venture capital and pension funds).
Chart 1 presents a characterization of the number and average value of equity stakes across banks with 
diverse dimensions (the size of the circle measures the market share of the bank). As expected, larger 
banks have a higher number of participations through the bank and non-bank divisions than smaller banks. 
In turn, the heterogeneity in the average value of the equity stake across smaller banks is larger than 
across larger banks. In our sample, the average equity stake per observation, measured as a percentage 
of the book value of equity is 12%, while the median is 5%.
Chart 2 presents summary statistics for the loan variable and ﬁ  rm-level variables. This characterization 
is independently carried out for ﬁ  rms with equity stakes hold by banks and for the ones without equity 
stakes hold by banks. Concerning loans granted by banks as a percentage of the total loans of the ﬁ  rm, 
we observe that loans granted by banks that are simultaneously creditors and shareholders of the ﬁ  rm 
Chart 1






















































































Average value of a equity stake 
Source: Authors’ calculations.




Notes: The triangles represent the percentile 95 and the squares represent percentile 25. The lower and upper limits of the grey area 





















































































































































represent, on average, 40% of the total loans of the ﬁ  rm. Taking into account all ﬁ  rm/bank observations 
when the bank does not have an equity stake, the average loan is lower (25%), implying that when a 
bank has an equity stake in a given ﬁ  rm it is more likely to grant a loan to that ﬁ  rm.
Firms where banks have an equity stake are, on average, slightly larger but with less tangible assets. Firms 
where banks have an equity stake are also less proﬁ  table and the importance of foreign shareholders 
is smaller. We do not observe a signiﬁ  cant difference in the number of banking relationships between 
the two groups of ﬁ  rms. The analysis of other variables not presented in this article, but available in 
Antão, Ferreira and Lacerda (2011), allows us to conclude that ﬁ  rms where banks have an equity stake 
are more likely to have public debt and to be publicly listed. These ﬁ  rms also present a lower interest 
coverage ratio.
4. Empirical results
A close relationship between a bank and a ﬁ  rm should be associated with a better information ﬂ  ow, 
allowing banks to better screen loans. In fact, the proximity between the bank and the borrower may 
overcome problems of asymmetric information. In this setting, the main objective of this work is to 
test if banks with equity stakes in a ﬁ  rm are more likely to capture future loans of that ﬁ  rm. To test this 
hypothesis, for each ﬁ  rm and in each year, we create a set of 20 potential lenders, which results in 20 
ﬁ  rm-bank pairs per year. Each pair ﬁ  rm-bank, for each year, is the unit of observation in our sample. We 
estimate a logit model and a linear regression (OLS) model:
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,, , 1 , ,,
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where Loani,g,t is a dummy variable equal to one if bank g grants credit to ﬁ  rm i in year t and zero 
otherwise in the case of the logit model; or the credit granted by bank g to ﬁ  rm i as a percentage of 
the total loans of the ﬁ  rm in year t in the case of the OLS model. Bank Ownershipi,g,t is a dummy vari-
able equal to one if bank g has an equity stake in ﬁ  rm i in year t, and zero otherwise; or the equity 
stake of bank g as a percentage of the book value of equity of ﬁ  rm i in year t; this variable is lagged 
one period. Credit Relationshipi,g,t is the value of the loans that bank g granted to ﬁ  rm i at the end of 
the year before the variable Loan is assessed. Xi,t are ﬁ  rm-level control variables, including assets (log), 
return on investment, tangible assets, interest coverage, leverage, number of banking relationships, 
number of bank shareholders, ﬁ  rm with public debt outstanding dummy variable and publicly traded 
ﬁ  rm dummy variable. All ﬁ  rm-level control variables are lagged one period. Yg,t is market share of each 
bank g considering only loans granted to the corporate sector in year t. θt is a year ﬁ  xed effect, αi is a 
ﬁ  rm (or industry) ﬁ  xed effect, and φg is a bank ﬁ  xed effect. We estimate a speciﬁ  cation with industry 
and year ﬁ  xed effects and a speciﬁ  cation with ﬁ  rm, bank and year ﬁ  xed effects. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the ﬁ  rm level.
4.1. Results for hypothesis 1
Table 2 reports the estimates of equation (1) when testing hypothesis 1 that banks with equity stakes 
on a given ﬁ  rm face a higher probability of attracting future lending business from that ﬁ  rm. Columns 
(1)-(4) report the results for the logit speciﬁ  cation and columns (5) and (6) report the results for the OLS 
speciﬁ  cation. In order to avoid spurious inference we exclude outliers winsorizing the variables. The 
coefﬁ  cient on the bank ownership variable is positive and statistically signiﬁ  cant in all speciﬁ  cations. The 
effect is also economically signiﬁ  cant.
The results in table 2 show that the positive effect of bank ownership on the choice a future lender is 









speciﬁ  cation where the dependent variable is the share of loans of the bank in a ﬁ  rm. Finally, we estimate 
a speciﬁ  cation with ﬁ  rm (and bank) ﬁ  xed effects. The ﬁ  rm ﬁ  xed effects results show that time-invariant 
unobservable ﬁ  rm characteristics do not seem to explain our ﬁ  ndings.
Using the estimate of the bank ownership (dummy) coefﬁ  cient in column (1), the predicted probability of 
a bank granting credit to a ﬁ  rm if it does not have an equity stake in the ﬁ  rm is 14%, while the predicted 
probability of granting credit to the ﬁ  rm if it has an equity stake is 25% (other variables evaluated at 
their means). Thus, holding everything else equal, the probability of a bank granting credit to a ﬁ  rm is 
increased by 10.7 percentage points if it has an equity stake in the borrowing ﬁ  rm.
Other explanatory variables have the predicted sign and have a signiﬁ  cant impact on the lender choice. The 
market share of the bank in the loan market has a positive and signiﬁ  cant coefﬁ  cient. Using the estimates 
in column (1), we observe that when the market share is increased from the 5th- to the 95th-percentile, 
the probability of a bank granting credit to a ﬁ  rm increases by 40 percentage points. In addition, the 
existence of a past credit relationship has a positive and signiﬁ  cant coefﬁ  cient, which indicates that past 
lending relationships increase the likelihood that the bank will be chosen for future loans by the same ﬁ  rm.
Table 3 presents the results of robustness checks that include additional control variables. We ﬁ  rst control 
for bank public debt ownership, i.e., if the bank granting the credit also own debt securities issued 
by the ﬁ  rm. We consider both a dummy variable and a continuous variable similar to the bank equity 
ownership. We also include other ﬁ  rm-level control variables, including ﬁ  rm size, proﬁ  tability, leverage, 
interest, assets tangibility, number of banking relationships, number of ﬁ  nancial shareholders, if the ﬁ  rm 
has debt securities and if it has foreign shareholders. Our results remain robust as the coefﬁ  cient of the 
Bank Ownership variable is positive and signiﬁ  cant. Firm size and the number of banking relationships 
have a positive and signiﬁ  cant effect on granted loans, while interest coverage has a negative effect.
We conducted other robustness tests. We check the sensitivity of the results to a different deﬁ  nition 
of bank equity stakes, that uses a different reference value – equity stakes are positive only if they are 
Table 2
EFFECT OF BANK EQUITY STAKE ON LENDING
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank ownership (dummy) 0.695*** 0.411* 0.021***
(3.55) (1.87) (2.63)
Bank ownership (%) 3.575*** 3.239*** 0.169***
(4.60) (2.79) (3.54)
Bank market share 11.655*** 9.589*** 11.673*** 9.580*** 0.343*** 0.343***
(78.58) (12.33) (78.72) (12.32) (8.39) (8.39)
Credit relationship 12.404*** 8.763*** 12.403*** 8.763*** 0.706*** 0.705***
(27.69) (29.49) (27.69) (29.48) (113.22) (113.10)
Industry dummies Yes No Yes No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Firm dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Model Logit Conditional logit Logit Conditional logit OLS OLS
pseudo-R2 0.501 0.501 0.592 0.592
Semi-elasticity (bank ownership) 0.107*** 0.437***
(2.93) (4.60)
Number of observations 268887 264349 266667 264349 268887 268887
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: In columns 1 to 4, the dependent variable takes a value of one if the banking group grants credit to the ﬁ  rm in a given year 
and zero otherwise. In columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is the weight of the credit granted by a banking group to a ﬁ  rm in 
a given year on the total credit of the ﬁ  rm in the same year. All variables as deﬁ  ned in table 1. Robust t-statistics adjusted for ﬁ  rm 































































above 5% of the book value of equity, rather than 1%. We ﬁ  nd that the predicted probability of a 
bank granting credit to a ﬁ  rm increases from 14% if it does not have an equity stake in the ﬁ  rm to 28% 
if it has an equity stake. We next estimate speciﬁ  cations to take into account the division within the 
banking group that has the equity stake on the ﬁ  rm. We divide bank divisions into two groups: banks 
and non-banks (mutual fund, pension fund, venture capital or insurance company). Non-bank divisions 
cannot grant loans, but can invest in the borrowing ﬁ  rm. Moreover, the rationale for investing in a ﬁ  rm 
may be different across the different types of bank divisions. We ﬁ  nd that the probability of a bank 
granting credit to a ﬁ  rm is increased by 14 percentage points if it has an equity stake in the borrowing 
ﬁ  rm through the bank. Moreover, we ﬁ  nd a similar effect if the equity stake is owned by a non-bank 
division bank of the banking group. Overall, our results are robust to these alternative deﬁ  nitions of the 
size and type of bank equity stake.
Table 3
EFFECT OF BANK EQUITY STAKE ON LENDING | ROBUSTNESS TESTS
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank ownership (dummy) 0.501* 0.021***
(2.11) (2.54)
Bank ownership (%) 3.638*** 0.173***
(2.92) (3.32)
Bank market share 9.208*** 9.142*** 0.342*** 0.339***
(10.21) (10.15) (6.61) (6.65)
Credit relationship 9.351*** 9.353*** 0.704*** 0.703***
(24.82) (24.81) (99.35) (100.86)
Bank public debt ownership (dummy) 0.367** -0.000
(2.43) (-0.07)
Bank public debt ownership (%) 0.742 0.020
(0.79) (0.44)
Log of assets 0.249*** 0.250*** 0.001* 0.001*
(5.06) (5.10) (1.74) (1.73)
Return on investment 0.051 0.053 -0.002 -0.001
(0.21) (0.22) (-0.41) (-0.42)
Tangible ﬁ  xed assets 0.245 0.243 -0.001 -0.001
(1.58) (1.57) (-0.73) (-0.76)
Interest coverage -0.001** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000
(-2.46) (-2.46) (-0.77) (-0.76)
Leverage 0.152 0.155 -0.000 -0.001
(1.47) (1.50) (-0.83) (-0.93)
Number of lending relationships 0.145*** 0.150*** -0.000 0.000
(18.40) (18.37) (-0.00) (0.01)
Number of ﬁ  nancial shareholders -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000
(-0.20) (-0.21) (1.42) (1.40)
Bonds 0.043 0.044 0.000 0.000
(1.05) (1.08) (0.63) (0.59)
Foreign capital -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(-0.91) (-0.91) (0.78) (0.77)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Conditional logit Conditional logit OLS OLS
pseudo-R2 0.509 0.509 0.589 0.589
Number of observations 193 292 193 292 196 355 196 355
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable takes a value of one if the banking group grants credit to the ﬁ  rm in a given year 
and zero otherwise. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the weight of the credit granted by a banking group to a ﬁ  rm in 
a given year on the total credit of the ﬁ  rm in the same year. All variables as deﬁ  ned in table 1. Robust t-statistics adjusted for ﬁ  rm 









4.2. Results for hypothesis 2
In this section we test hypothesis 2 that stronger ﬁ  rm-bank relationships have an effect on the probability 
of an insider bank to grant a loan to the ﬁ  rm. From the ﬁ  rm’s point of view, a stronger bank relationship 
may be considered valuable as banks may be more willing to make unproﬁ  table loans to customers during 
difﬁ  cult ﬁ  nancial times when they trust losses will be recouped over the course of a long relationship. On 
the other hand, banks may acquire private information over the course of a relationship and effectively 
“lock-in” customers. Several empirical studies use the duration of a bank borrower relationship as a 
measure of the strength of relationship. Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) ﬁ  nd 
that the duration of the bank-borrower relationship positively affects the availability of credit. This result 
is consistent with the idea that the longer the duration of the relationship, the greater the information 
exchange. On the other hand, Ongena and Smith (2000) conclude that the value of a relationship declines 
through time and that ﬁ  rms are able to end relationships early, possibly to avoid lock-in. Moreover, the 
ability of one bank to hold-up a ﬁ  rm is lower for ﬁ  rms with alternative sources of bank credit.
To test hypothesis 2, we estimate the logit and OLS models with ﬁ  rm and bank ﬁ  xed effects in equation 
(1) including an interaction term of the bank ownership variable with a ﬁ  rm variable. For our empirical 
tests, we use two variables to proxy for the strength of the relationship between the ﬁ  rm and the bank: 
the number of banking relationships and the number of ﬁ  nancial shareholders of the ﬁ  rm. We expect 
that a ﬁ  rm with a higher number of lending relationships or a higher number of ﬁ  nancial shareholders to 
have a lower likelihood to select the insider bank as future lender. In contrast, ﬁ  rms with a lower number 
of lending relationships, or ﬁ  nancial shareholders, are more likely to rely on the insider bank, as they are 
more exposed to adverse selection (lemons problem) if they do not use the insider bank to obtain credit.
The coefﬁ  cient of the interaction terms are negative and signiﬁ  cant in both cases, suggesting that the 
positive impact of bank ownership on credit granted decreases with the number of lending relationships 
and the number of ﬁ  nancial shareholders (See table 4). Firms with more lending relationships tend to be 
able to obtain credit form other banks besides the insider bank, which contributes to reduce the ability 
of the insider bank to hold-up the ﬁ  rm. Insider banks of ﬁ  rms with more ﬁ  nancial shareholders may have 
access to less information. In both cases, the effect of the insider bank of the choice of future lenders 
decreases. In general, the results are consistent with hypothesis 2 but results need to be interpreted 
with caution as the marginal effect, and its signiﬁ  cance level depends on the different values taken by 
the variables.
4.3. Endogeneity
Endogeneity problems are ubiquitous in empirical research on corporate governance. In our setting, 
there could be many reasons for bank equity stakes and lender choice to be jointly determined. We have 
already addressed the potential endogeneity problem using ﬁ  rm ﬁ  xed effects methods that control for 
unobserved sources of ﬁ  rm heterogeneity. Fixed effects methods solve joint determination problems in 
which an unobserved time-invariant variable simultaneously determines both lender choice and bank 
ownership. It is also equivalent to looking only at within-ﬁ  rm changes in bank ownership. The ﬁ  xed 
effects results go a long way toward dismissing omitted variables explanations as sources of endogeneity. 
Because only the effects of within-ﬁ  rm changes in bank ownership are taken into account, ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ  c 
omitted variables cannot explain the observed relation between lender choice and banker ownership.
Another approach to address endogeneity concerns is to use lagged bank ownership as an explanatory 
variable. We have done so in all our estimations. However, one could think that a one-year lag is not 
sufﬁ  cient to address the joint determination concern. Thus, we estimate the logit and OLS models with 































































We also use two-stage least squares (2SLS) address the potential endogeneity. Two-stage least squares 
methods allow us to address omitted variables and reverse causality issues simultaneously. To assess the 
robustness of our conclusions from our instrumental variable tests, we employ an additional empirical 
strategy that involves estimating the effect of an endogenously chosen dummy variable (bank owner-
ship) on another endogenous variable, which is continuous (credit granted by a bank to the ﬁ  rm as 
a percentage of the total loans of the ﬁ  rm). This set-up can be estimated using the treatment effects 
model. Details for this analysis can be found in Antão, Ferreira and Lacerda (2011). The coefﬁ  cient is 
positive and signiﬁ  cant. Thus, after controlling for endogeneity, in both 2SLS and a treatment effects 
model, we continue to ﬁ  nd that banks with equity stakes in the borrower are more likely to be chosen 
to provide future loans.
5. Conclusion
Our paper aims to measure the effects of a bank corporate control, through equity stakes, in the credit 
market, in particular in the choice of the lender. As the establishment of an equity link with a borrower 
allows for more efﬁ  cient information production and processing in offering future loans, a lender with 
an equity stake in the borrower should be more likely to secure the future business of its borrowers. 
Using a sample of Portuguese private and publicly listed ﬁ  rms, we ﬁ  nd that the existence of an equity 
stake in a borrower signiﬁ  cantly increases the likelihood of winning this borrower’s future loan busi-
ness. Our ﬁ  ndings are not explained by bank reputation, past lending relationships and a variety of ﬁ  rm 
characteristics such as ﬁ  rm size and complexity, performance, ownership structure, and leverage, among 
others. Moreover, the results are robust to the inclusion of ﬁ  rm (and bank) ﬁ  xed effects. The ﬁ  rm ﬁ  xed-
effects speciﬁ  cation controls for unobserved sources of ﬁ  rm heterogeneity and solves problems in which 
an unobserved time-invariant variable simultaneously determines both the lender choice and the bank 
equity stake in the borrower ﬁ  rm.
Table 4
THE STRENGHT OF RELATIONSHIPS











ﬁ  nancial 
shareholders
Bank ownership (dummy) 1.286*** 0.732*** 0.044** 0.033***
(3.37) (2.58) (2.52) (2.88)
Bank ownership x ﬁ  rm variable -0.145*** -0.017*** -0.004 -0.001**
(-3.20) (-2.76) (-1.65) (-2.30)
Firm variable 0.175*** 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(23.16) (0.26) (-0.06) (-0.39)
Bank market share 9.031*** 8.615*** 0.343*** 0.343***
(11.64) (12.37) (8.39) (8.39)
Credit relationship 8.623*** 8.762*** 0.706*** 0.706***
(29.92) (29.49) (113.19) (113.17)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Conditional logit Conditional logit OLS OLS
pseudo-R2 0.505 0.501 0.592 0.592
Number of observations 264 349 264 349 268 887 268 887
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable takes a value of one if the banking group grants credit to the ﬁ  rm in a given year 
and zero otherwise. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the weight of the credit granted by a banking group to a ﬁ  rm in 
a given year on the total credit of the ﬁ  rm in the same year. All variables as deﬁ  ned in table 1. Robust t-statistics adjusted for ﬁ  rm 









Our ﬁ  ndings suggest that universal banks involvement in non-ﬁ  nancial corporations as shareholders 
has implications in the credit market. An insider bank is likely to be the ﬁ  rm’s main lender, which may 
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